Amnesty says Israeli attacks on Lebanon health sector should be probed as war crimes

JERUSALEM: Israel’s domestic security agency Shin Bet acknowledged on Tuesday its failure in preventing Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, saying that if it had acted differently the deadliest day in Israel’s history could have been averted.
The Internal Security Agency, as it is formally known, said that an internal probe “reveals that if the Shin Bet had acted differently, both in the years leading up to the attack and on the night of the attack... the massacre could have been prevented.”
The acknowledgement comes days after an Israeli military investigations noted similar failings to protect Israelis during the attack, which left hundreds dead and sparked a devastating war in the Gaza Strip, where tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed.
In the opening lines of the summary of findings from the Shin Bet investigation, the agency’s chief Ronen Bar takes responsiblity for failures, saying that “as the head of the organization, I will bear this heavy burden on my shoulders for the rest of my life.”
However, he added that in order to truly understand how the unprecedented attack was not stopped, there needed to be a broader probe into the role of Israel’s security and political elements and the cooperation between them.
According to the summary, the investigation focused on two key areas — the direct reasons that led to the Shin Bet failing to recognize the immediate threat from Hamas, and the developments preceding the attack.
It noted that “the investigation found no indication that the Shin Bet underestimated the enemy,” Palestinian militant group Hamas.
“On the contrary, there was a deep understanding of the threat, initiatives, and a desire to neutralize the threat, particularly targeting Hamas leadership,” the summary said.
The investigation found that prior knowledge of a Hamas attack plan was not treated as an “actionable threat” and there was an overarching assessment that Hamas was more focused on “inciting violence” in the occupied West Bank.
Additionally, the investigation found that “a policy of quiet had enabled Hamas to undergo massive military buildup,” with financial aid from Qatar going directly to Hamas’s military wing.
In conclusion, the agency said in its summary, “the Shin Bet failed to provide a warning regarding the scope of the attack and the large-scale raid by Hamas” that sparked months of war in Gaza.
“The warning issued on the night of October 7 was not translated into operational directives, and the response given by the Shin Bet... was insufficient to prevent or thwart the large scale attack.”
In the military inquiry, which includes 77 separate investigations into what transpired in communities, army bases and multiple confrontation points around the Gaza periphery, the army noted flaws in its intelligence assessments of Hamas, including the group’s military capabilities and overall intentions.
“We did not even imagine such a scenario,” said an army official who had briefed the media ahead of the probe’s release on Thursday.
The official said the army had not maintained “a comprehensive understanding of the enemy’s military capabilities” and that it was “overconfident in its knowledge.”
“We were addicted to precise intel,” a second senior military official said at the same briefing, explaining that despite signs Hamas was preparing to attack, the army was too focused on what it believed was accurate information.
Also following the publication of the findings of the army’s investigation, the outgoing chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, said that he took full responsibility for failing to predict or stop the attack.
In addition to Halevi, the head of the military’s southern command, Major General Yaron Finkelman, and military intelligence chief Major General Aharon Haliva have both stepped down.