Lebanon’s divisions risk derailing its renewal

I am not one who believes that the ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel is about to unravel, even if the Israeli withdrawal seems to have stalled. At least not yet. I also do not believe that the rhetoric of the Lebanese militia aligned with Iran — which is intensifying, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from all southern border villages to allow their inhabitants to return to their flattened homes — will threaten to derail the political consensus that has prevailed in Lebanon and is now taking root.

Despite the many hurdles, the government of nominated Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is likely to find a formula of inclusivity and will hopefully get the wheels of the executive branch turning once again. The Lebanese on all sides of the divides privately wish to see it embark on long-awaited and desperately needed reforms.

The tentative steps made by the Lebanese state, with the backing of international and Arab countries, to elect a president and install a new government that has not been manufactured by Hezbollah are likely to be challenged by the persistent die-hard culture of its entrenched and corrupt political elite. They are part of a system that has, for decades, allowed a culture of sectarian clientelism, in which regional, tribal and local identities and objectives — and even those of foreign powers like the now-defunct Assad regime and those of Iran — to supersede and overpower those of the nation.

Even if the government wins a confidence vote, the colossal task of reforming the state might require the long-standing support of the international community, as well as the Lebanese population, a large chunk of which is known for being a tool in the hands of the corrupt political elites.

The tentative steps made by the Lebanese state are likely to be challenged by the die-hard culture of its corrupt political elite

Mohamed Chebaro

The new administration faces many huge tasks. The simplest, contrary to conventional wisdom, will be the rebuilding of areas leveled by Israeli airstrikes during the war with Hezbollah, as long as the militia disarms and becomes a political player, like the rest of the various other players in this forever-fractured nation.

The launching of the long-stalled reform projects, as required by international financial institutions and donors, is what might pose the biggest challenge going forward. Addressing the root causes of the Lebanese financial meltdown is what might make or break the chances of the country being able to clean up its act. It must slim down its public sector spending, which has ballooned due to clientelism, and reduce its indebtedness if it is to be worthy of the debt rescheduling that would slowly refloat its collapsed banking system. For too long, its economy has been run as the fiefdom of a powerful mafia-like ruling elite.

The Lebanese economic crisis, which began taking shape in October 2019, has been described by the World Bank as one of the top three most severe global crises since 1850. The country’s downfall stemmed from a variety of political factors, such as the government’s failure to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and its lack of willingness to promote recovery.

At its core, the crisis is linked to the political makeup of the ruling coalitions that have succeeded, time and again, in delaying and wasting time. This has made it impossible to implement any reforms, as that would weaken the political elite’s grip on power. Instead, they have dispensed rewards to their supporters in the shape of public sector jobs and bought their long-term allegiance.

Lebanon has no time to waste and its new government needs to speedily rubber-stamp the IMF agreement to address the most urgent problems facing the country. This would also prevent its political elite from sabotaging and blocking such reforms through the various dirty maneuvers and delay tactics it has applied since 2019 to torpedo any changes. The government must rush to show it can make a difference, so that its enemies are not allowed to mobilize the public to protest and block any such process.

Yes, the dynamic of the fragmented political class makes it easy to muddy the waters and apportion blame. This traditionally happened as the political elites tried to protect their business cartels and interests, denying transparency and accountability for fear of exposing the corruption that has gone on for decades, all in the hope that this would buy them time until the day the newly found gas reserves in Lebanon’s territorial waters could be profitably exploited.

The launching of the long-stalled reform projects is what might pose the biggest challenge going forward

Mohamed Chebaro

It is hoped that the new administration of the ex-army chief turned president and the ex-lawyer and judge turned politician and prime minister — both of whom are supposedly not from Lebanon’s corrupt elite — will have a remedy for the traps laid ahead of them and will succeed in finding ways to circumvent the old elite and activate government institutions to be the sole driver of growth and benefit for all.

It is also hoped that the bloody and regrettable events on the border with Israel will not multiply to a point that distract from the task at hand. Reforming the public sector and cutting jobs is likely to be the bitter remedy that is needed, as that will bring the IMF back on board and boost the confidence of donors. All this will be conducive to stopping the bleeding, redressing the economy and stabilizing the national currency. It may even lead to the refloating of the banking system and, who knows, one day the depositors robbed of their savings might be able to regain access to the money that was frozen by the old government’s capital control.

• Mohamed Chebaro is a British-Lebanese journalist with more than 25 years’ experience covering war, terrorism, defense, current affairs and diplomacy.