Turkiye’s delicate balancing act in the Black Sea

The Black Sea has historically been a region of strategic value for Turkiye, Russia and the West. Russia’s war on Ukraine has increased its importance as the region became the center of gravity for Western-Russian rivalry.

Turkiye’s navy is the strongest in the Black Sea, which is also bordered by Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Georgia. Western allies in the Black Sea, vulnerable to Russia’s policies, are seeking a stronger Turkish presence to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense capabilities on its southeastern flank. However, the Black Sea is a “gray zone” for Ankara: it cannot fully commit to one side or the other.

This was evident when Turkiye did not join the Western-led sanctions against Russia, and invoked the Montreux Convention to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to the warships of “belligerent powers.” The 1936 agreement gives Turkiye the authority to regulate naval access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean via those straits. The decision left Moscow unable to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet against Ukrainian attacks, although it also prevented NATO warships from entering the Black Sea to help Ukraine.

This is an excellent example of how Turkiye’s position, as the gatekeeper of the Black Sea, is crucial for the balance of power between Russia and the West in this region. It has the ability to shape events while watching from the sidelines. For this reason, both the West and Russia have accelerated efforts to integrate Turkiye into their Black Sea policies, which will be crucial when the war finally ends. Concerned about its inability to contain a postwar Russia without US support, NATO is establishing a cooperation initiative with Turkiye through Romania and Bulgaria, both NATO members.

Turkiye is also wary of antagonizing Russia, a dominant power in the Black Sea and viewed as a threat by the West — although not by Ankara

Sinem Cengiz

One form this takes is a proposed new NATO command HQ that will be responsible for improving operational coordination among NATO allies in the Black Sea. Last year, Turkiye, Romania and Bulgaria also established a mine countermeasures task force in the Black Sea, reflecting Turkiye’s commitment to maritime safety. NATO aims to extend this cooperation.

Turkiye’s openness to regional cooperation with coastal states in the Black Sea and its efforts to support Ukraine’s navy are crucial for postwar security.

However, Turkiye is also wary of antagonizing Russia, a dominant power in the Black Sea and viewed as a threat by the West — although not by Ankara, because its perception of threats is different. For example, the eastern Mediterranean holds greater strategic significance for Turkiye than the Black Sea. Turkiye prioritizes positioning its powerful navy in the eastern Mediterranean to protect its interests, which clash with several actors. The increase in Turkiye’s naval capacity in the eastern Mediterranean is not welcomed by NATO allies, while at the same time they seek Turkiye’s support in the Black Sea against Russian dominance. European states have often excluded Ankara from discussions on the eastern Mediterranean.

This European policy has played into the hands of Russia, which filled the void by deepening economic cooperation with Turkiye: for example, the TurkStream pipeline across the Black Sea. Russia also chose to go along with Turkiye’s balancing act, for example accepting the Turkish role in negotiating the 2022-2023 Black Sea grain deal between Russia and Ukraine: this maintained communication between Moscow and Ankara, which is mostly personal rather than institutional — unlike the Turkish-European/NATO relationship.

Turkiye’s approach to the Black Sea is not driven solely by the current leadership: it is rooted in a long-standing strategic policy

Sinem Cengiz

The seemingly cozy leadership ties between Turkiye and Russia are shaping their policies in the Black Sea and beyond. For example, in 2023, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan met Vladimir Putin, he referred to the Black Sea as “our Black Sea” to indicate common interests and destiny. However, when relations were tense in 2016, Erdogan said the Black Sea had become a “Russian lake” and advocated a greater NATO presence in the region. Russia will remain the most important factor in Turkiye’s Black Sea policy, shaped by the cooperative and competitive nature of Turkish-Russian relations.

Turkiye’s approach to the Black Sea is not driven solely by the current leadership: it is rooted in a long-standing strategic policy, similar to Russia’s, which views the Black Sea as the gateway to warm waters and the Mediterranean. Navigational safety is therefore crucial for all. For Moscow, it would ease Russian agricultural exports; for the West, it would provide a lifeline for Ukraine’s economic and military survival; for Ankara, it would increase its leverage with the other two.

Thus, Turkiye’s position in the Black Sea will probably affect the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus. It is, after all, Turkiye’s historical backyard. If it carefully reads the situation, Turkiye will stand to be the greatest beneficiary in shaping new dynamics in the Black Sea region.

• Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz