Europe needs to be pragmatic about defense spending

The issue of Europe not spending enough on defense has irked American policymakers for decades. The criticism peaked during President Donald Trump’s first term and it remains a contentious issue in his second one.
When Russia invaded Ukraine the first time, in 2014, only three NATO members — the US, the UK and Greece — met the alliance’s target for defense spending by members of 2 percent of gross domestic product. Fast forward more than a decade and 23 members now meet that goal. This is progress but several countries still fall short.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was supposed to be a wake-up call for Europe. Across the continent, leaders pledged to do more for their own defense. Commitments poured in to increase military spending, modernize armed forces, and arm Ukraine both with existing stockpiles and newly manufactured weapons. Some of these promises were fulfilled, others ignored or quietly forgotten. Yes, Europe is in a better place now in terms of defense spending but the work is far from finished.
This is where the EU is trying to step in. Since the early days of European integration, defense has been a difficult area in which to build consensus. This is understandable; the decision to send a country’s young men and women into harm’s way is one of the most sacred responsibilities of a national government. It should not be made by distant bureaucrats in Brussels.
Before President Trump came onto the scene, the US was wary of EU-led defense efforts. Washington feared that scarce European defense funds might be siphoned away from NATO to support EU initiatives. At a time when most NATO members were underinvesting in defense, any duplication or dilution of resources was seen as a threat to alliance capabilities.
The US also did not want its influence within Europe’s security architecture diminished. This is understandable, considering the economic importance of Europe to Washington, and America’s substantial contributions to the continent’s defense since the Second World War.
In the late 1990s, when the EU’s defense ambitions started to gain momentum, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright outlined the US position with her “three Ds” policy: no discrimination against non-EU NATO members (who at the time included the US, Canada, Norway, and Turkiye, later joined by the post-Brexit UK and others); no decoupling of US security guarantees from Europe; and no duplication of NATO capabilities.
But Trump’s arrival shifted American attitudes. Some in his orbit are perfectly comfortable with the idea of the US playing a reduced role in NATO, or even leaving the alliance altogether. As a result, they welcome the idea of the EU stepping up to carry more of the defense burden.

The EU should pursue an open defense market, one that maximizes the capabilities available to European armed forces.

Luke Coffey

European advocates of deeper integration, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, have seized on this shift to push for what he calls “strategic autonomy,” or the idea that Europe should be able to manage its military affairs without relying on NATO or the US.
While this might be a fashionable idea in Paris and Brussels, it deeply unsettles many nations in Eastern Europe. These countries, which live under the shadow of Russian aggression, know firsthand the importance of US military power in preserving peace and stability. For them, any weakening of transatlantic ties could be disastrous, if not an existential threat.
In response to Russia’s aggression, the EU launched a €150 million ($164 million) initiative to co-finance defense procurement among member states. But there was a catch; at least 65 percent of that funding must be spent on products manufactured within the EU. In other words, the policy explicitly discriminates against non-EU NATO members, exactly what Madeleine Albright warned against 25 years ago.
It is easy to understand why countries might want to favor domestic defense industries. In times of crisis, it is reassuring to know that critical military capabilities will be available without relying on foreign suppliers, even friendly ones. That logic has only been reinforced by Trump-era threats to withhold military support from allies, and even the Obama administration selectively restricted arms sales to key American allies.
But defense policy cannot be reduced to a jobs program. Of course countries will want to maintain certain key capabilities at home, but in a world defined by alliances and interdependence it makes sense to share the burden. Governments should seek the best military equipment at the best price, without compromising security.
The EU’s 65 percent internal defense spending requirement is counterproductive. It shuts out some of the world’s top defense producers: the US, the UK, and Turkiye. All three countries offer proven, high-quality systems, from American and British air-defense platforms to cutting-edge Turkish drones. These capabilities could significantly enhance Europe’s defense posture, especially in light of the threats from Russia and instability in the wider neighborhood.
If the EU truly wants to be taken seriously on defense, it should pursue an open and competitive defense market, one that maximizes the capabilities available to European armed forces rather than limiting them in the name of industrial policy.
Unfortunately, change is unlikely. The recent escalation of Trump’s global trade war, including new tariffs on EU goods, will only reinforce the protectionist instincts of Brussels. But the cost of these instincts could be high. After all, 23 of 27 EU members are also in NATO. If Brussels limits their ability to procure the best hardware from wherever it is produced, it could weaken not only the EU’s own defense posture but that of NATO as well.
At a time when the future of Ukraine hangs in the balance, and the White House’s commitment to NATO is being questioned, Europe cannot afford to let ideology or industrial politics get in the way of military readiness. It must be pragmatic. That means buying the best equipment available, regardless of whether it is built in France, the UK, Turkiye, or the US.
Anything less would not only undermine Europe’s ability to defend itself, it would play directly into the hands of those who want to see the transatlantic alliance fail.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey