German elections are a final warning to democratic parties

In December, when the German government, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, lost the confidence of the Bundestag, not only did it spark a general election, it also provoked the fear of a deepening international crisis on top of the domestic one.
Between Vladimir Putin’s Russia growing more emboldened in its aggression toward Ukraine, and the twilight of one US administration and the imminent dawn of a new and more volatile one with a precarious attitude toward Europe, the news of another divisive German election was greeted with deep concern.
By the time the election results were announced last Sunday, trans-Atlantic tensions had heightened as it became increasingly apparent that the view of a united front between the US and Europe on halting Putin’s aggression was not shared by the new American president, Donald Trump, who started to inflict tariffs on European goods, thereby threatening the recovery of an already underperforming economy.
The results of the German election should be greeted with a mixture of relief and grave concern. The relief is because despite the rise of the far-right in the form of the AfD (Alternative for Germany) party, it is still not in a position to win elections or make it impossible for the largest parties to form a governing coalition without it.
On the other hand, the AfD, some of whose members have been associated with neo-Nazis, and which has normalized and legitimized extreme anti-immigration and national-chauvinistic rhetoric, received more than 10 million votes, representing just over 20 percent of the total vote. In light of the country’s history, this is an uncomfortable development.
For now, this party, along with some of its more repulsive policies, will remain in opposition. Germany is likely to be governed, once again, by a grand coalition of the center-right CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party, along with the support of a number of smaller parties. The CDU/CSU, led by the presumed next German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, won the most seats, with 28.5 percent of the vote. The SDP, led by the current chancellor, Olaf Scholz, came in third with just 16.4 percent of the vote.
Nevertheless, the sight of the AfD being held at arm’s length from a position of power should not lull anyone into a false sense of security. The symbolism, let alone the tangible threat, of the rise of a party with such an overt anti-minority stance — its co-leader, Alexander Gauland, has vowed, for example, to fight against “an invasion of foreigners” into Germany — should not escape us.
It is hardly a consolation that nearly 80 percent of Germans rejected the AfD’s policies, because the party’s share of the vote continues to increase from election to election, legitimizing its vile ideas. The fact that it is disproportionately supported by young, very angry, men (mainly from the former East Germany) could ensure its longevity in politics, unless the reasons for its emerging strength are addressed.
Hence, a failure to heed Merz’s warnings that domestically, the rise of the AfD is a “final warning” to democratic parties — and internationally, that the continent is facing its “five minutes to midnight” moment, with shifting geopolitics and a possible weakening of the transatlantic alliance with the US under Trump — would be at our peril.
It is not enough to be appalled by the AfD’s policies. It is imperative that the reasons behind the divide between what used to be East and West Germany, and what angers young men about the establishment, are addressed. To some extent, this is a matter of “it’s the economy, stupid.” Nevertheless, the ability of the nationalist-reductionist-nativist right wing to lay almost the entire blame for their country’s stagnating economy on migrants, and more specifically on Muslim migrants, has to be challenged.

The results of the German election should be greeted with a mixture of relief and grave concern.

Yossi Mekelberg

Germany’s economy has long performed poorly, and after experiencing the economic “miracle” of the post-war years it now has one of the slowest growth rates in the EU, which is expected to be a mere 0.7 percent this year after two consecutive years in which the economy contracted.
Most experts highlight structural weaknesses, such as high energy costs, low public investment, and an overreliance on exports as the main causes of this slowdown, in addition to an export-driven economy, an erosion of its industrial base as a result of relocations to other countries, and an aging population (much of it due to the low birth-rate) as the underlying reasons for the weak economy.
None of that is linked to immigration; indeed, in some instances it suggests there is a need to allow more foreign workers into the country.
The divide between Germany’s east and west also indicates that more than 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and huge investments in efforts to bring about a more cohesive and equal society across the country, old divisions continue to run deep and the new government will have to concentrate not only on improving the economy but equally on improving democratic discourse.
If ensuring the cohesiveness of Germany is a massive job, keeping Europe together, with a common foreign and security policy, is a mega one. For obvious historical reasons, but increasingly as a matter of German convenience, when it comes to foreign and security policies, Germany has punched below its weight. Its defense expenditure is lower than that of most other NATO and EU countries, standing at just 1.6 percent of gross domestic product.
If Merz wishes to be true to his commitment that his “absolute priority” is to strengthen European security, he will have to find the money to do that. This, by itself, will be a tough task in an economy that is not growing and where there is the need to work within the country’s budgetary straitjacket, which limits new borrowing to 0.35 percent of GDP.
The state of the world dictates that “tough times call for tough measures,” and Merz has made it clear he has two massive battles on his hands. One is to lead the fightback in his country, and to a large extent across Europe, against the rise of the far right and the disturbing echoes of inter-war Germany.
The second, equally challenging task is to take the lead on European security in the face of a US administration that seems prepared to put the continent at risk in its overtures to Putin’s Russia.
Merz did not wait for the final election results to be announced, or until he officially became chancellor, before he began to question whether NATO, in its current form, has a future. He declared that the Trump administration “does not care much for Europe,” and therefore Europe should take immediate steps to become independent of Washington.
How his new government manages to cope with these twin challenges will define Germany, its prosperity, and European security for many decades to come, while also redefining Europe as an entity quite distinct from its alliance with the US and at the forefront of efforts to fortify liberal democracies.

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg