Gaza war compels China to review its Middle East policy

For nearly two decades, China’s approach to the Middle East has been characterized by what Sun Degang and other Chinese scholars have described as “a trade-off between maximum economic benefits and minimum political risks.” The carnage in Gaza and the attendant changes in the power equations across the Middle East now demand that Beijing take a fresh look at its diplomacy in the region.
This has already been reflected in the measured remarks of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who, speaking at UN headquarters last month, categorically stated that the Palestinian question “remains at the core of the Middle East issue” and, until it is resolved through the two-state solution, “the peace and security of all countries will be threatened.”
China has thus signaled that its earlier “hedging strategy” — the policy of “offending no one” — is no longer feasible. This approach had enabled China to build very substantial energy, economic and, through the Belt and Road Initiative, terrestrial and maritime connectivity links with the countries of the Gulf. Again, China’s recent engagements in the area of technology through the Digital Silk Road have coincided with the Gulf countries’ interest in developing their own digital economies, as set out in their ambitious “Vision” documents.
A decade ago, China’s hedging strategy approach had moved from passive to proactive. In 2017, Chinese scholars articulated their country’s “quasi-mediation diplomacy,” under which it would expand its role in the political and security arenas. At the heart of this approach was the “zero-enemy policy.” This involved the finalization of substantial strategic partnership agreements and the increasing engagement of major regional states in multilateral platforms supported by China.
Building on the earlier bilateral agreements and setting-up of dialogue platforms with Arab states, this approach has included China’s 25-year cooperation agreement with Iran signed in March 2021, the Saudi-Iran reconciliation agreement of March 2023, the July 2024 Beijing Accord between 14 Palestinian factions, and the extension of membership of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to major Middle Eastern countries.
The changes in the regional scenario as a result of the Gaza war and attendant confrontations with Iran and its allies call for a new diplomatic approach by China.
The principal changes in the regional scenario are: first, the emergence of a militarily triumphant Israel and its aggressive territorial claims in the Occupied Territories and Syria. Second, the significant weakening of Iran and its so-called axis of resistance. Third, the total support being extended by the US to Israel with regard to its maximalist regional agenda. And, finally, the severe setback to Palestinian aspirations for a sovereign state.

China now needs to assume a responsible role in the region’s security dynamics in order to confront the US-Israeli plans for long-term hegemony in the Middle East and to safeguard its own interests. 

Talmiz Ahmad

US President Donald Trump has complicated the picture with harsh rhetoric against Palestinian interests and Iran, affirming that a US-Israel alliance will dominate Middle East affairs. Trump has also made it clear that his “America First” approach includes challenging China’s political, economic and technological influence in the region.
While Chinese scholars such as Sun wrote in October 2024 that the US and China “share compatible and complementary interests” in terms of regional security and conflict de-escalation, this now has little relation with reality. In its engagements with Middle East states, China has always been conscious that the US views it as a rival and sees its expanding influence in zero-sum terms. Both the US and Israel, for instance, view China’s political and economic support for Iran negatively, as well as China’s silence on Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.
In the coming months, Trump may be expected to revive the “maximum pressure” approach toward Iran, while insisting that Gulf Cooperation Council states pursue the normalization of ties with Israel and increase their purchases of American weaponry. This, in short, requires them to abandon their affiliation with strategic autonomy that is at the heart of the GCC’s “Vision for Regional Security,” announced in March 2024. This will also inevitably require the dilution of their ties with China.
This will threaten Beijing’s crucial energy, economic and long-term strategic interests. The changed security scenario in the Middle East and the emerging challenges from the US require that China move beyond its hedging strategy and shape a new approach that effectively safeguards its interests. This should have the following attributes:
One, support the Gulf states’ commitment to strategic autonomy by making itself an indispensable energy, economic and security presence, with a robust pursuit of partnerships in diverse economic and political areas.
Two, expand energy, infrastructure and technological ties with Saudi Arabia, while promoting close ties between the GCC and Iran.
Three, extend full and overt support to Palestinian aspirations through involvement with reconstruction in Gaza and the West Bank and defend Palestinian interests at the UN and other international fora.
This approach calls for a fundamental review of China’s generally hands-off approach that has, over the years, yielded great benefits to it. Earlier, China took great umbrage when outgoing President Barack Obama described it as a “free rider” in the Middle East, i.e., obtaining advantages for itself while the US provided the security umbrella.
China now needs to assume a responsible role in the region’s security dynamics in order to confront the US-Israeli plans for long-term hegemony in the Middle East and to safeguard its own interests. This is also crucial for the future of the multipolar world order.

• Talmiz Ahmad is a former Indian diplomat.