Is a nuclear weapon a serious option for Iran?

The deadline set last week by US President Donald Trump for the Iranian government to engage in negotiations with Washington regarding its nuclear program, as well as related issues such as its ballistic missile program and Tehran’s influence and alliances in the Middle East, seems to have exerted pressure on the Iranian political leadership and even on the elites surrounding Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Iran submitted its response to Trump’s message through Omani mediators, who conveyed it to the White House. The Iranian foreign minister stated that responding through the sultanate is a natural course of action, given the trust that Iranians place in Omani leadership and the experience Muscat has gained as a mediator over many years. Furthermore, the Iranian leadership believes that any future discussions between the two countries will prominently involve Oman, especially since Iran continues to reject direct negotiations and prefers discussions to be conducted through intermediaries.
In parallel with this development, it is worth noting the remarks made by former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani, who was appointed as an adviser by Khamenei. Larijani stated that “the leader’s fatwa prohibits nuclear weapons; however, if America makes a mistake, the Iranian people may feel compelled to demand their production.” He further added in a television interview: “Their (the Americans’) wise individuals recognize that, if they attack Iran, it will drive the country toward nuclear armament.”
These statements are significant because they come from a prominent figure within the Iranian elite, who is also categorized as a moderate rather than a hard-liner. Larijani previously expressed critical views regarding the fundamentalist approach in Iran. This suggests that a perspective advocating for the acquisition of a “nuclear bomb” as a deterrent is gaining traction in discussions, especially in light of the Israeli strikes against Iran following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on Oct. 7, 2023, as well as the shifting balance of power and Tehran’s loss of military strength with respect to its two main allies: Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The military and security exposure faced by Iran has prompted some of its elites to adopt a more rigid approach, rather than pursuing more flexible diplomacy and direct negotiations with the US.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif were among the figures who advocated for a more pragmatic approach, encouraging direct negotiations. However, Khamenei has taken a different stance. While he did not outright reject the idea of negotiations and indicated a willingness to make specific concessions to mitigate the escalating losses, the election of Trump prompted Khamenei to reassess his position. He opted for indirect negotiations instead, rejecting direct talks and adopting a rigid stance against what he perceives as negotiations under duress or harsh preconditions.
Revisiting Larijani’s perspective on nuclear bomb manufacturing, he asserts that “the people will push to defend the country” and that “Iran has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, but it emphasizes that there is a fatwa prohibiting this.” However, he notes that “the fatwa is distinct from political decisions,” even though the fatwa issued by Khamenei is recorded with the UN.

There are numerous diplomatic alternatives that could be more beneficial for Tehran than pursuing a nuclear bomb.

Hassan Al-Mustafa

These statements elicited a range of both supportive and opposing reactions. Iranian Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Abbas Salehi stated that “the leader’s fatwa regarding the prohibition of nuclear weapons is not merely a legal opinion on branches of jurisprudence, but rather is based on immutable religious principles that are not subject to change and are not merely interpretative branches that can be altered.”
Iranian Middle East conflict researcher Mostafa Najafi said: “We should be skeptical about whether this threat will be effective, especially since he (Larijani) announces an attack on the country as a condition for manufacturing weapons.” He added: “I don’t know of any country in the world that is like that. They usually manufacture weapons so they won’t be attacked. Who knows if there will be anything left to build after an attack?” He believed that “Larijani’s remarks will intensify the threat rather than diminish it.”
Ali Hashem, a Lebanese researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, stated that “Mr. Larijani’s threat to pursue nuclear bomb production if the US attacks Iran is quite similar to the threat made by the late Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian at the onset of the Gaza war to escalate the conflict.” Hashem emphasized that “the reality that the Iranians fail to grasp is that threats are ineffective; rather, they indicate weakness rather than strength.”
This rejection of Larijani’s statements reflects the views of a significant segment of the reformist movement in Iran, as well as those aligned with former President Hassan Rouhani and some supporters of the late Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. However, a notable figure from the Construction Party founded by Rafsanjani, former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Ataollah Mohajerani, endorsed Larijani’s position. He stated that “the announcement regarding a shift in Iran’s nuclear doctrine, which was articulated in a thoughtful and timely interview with Dr. Ali Larijani, appears to be a clear and explicit decision by the regime aimed at safeguarding the country, the nation, the system and the Islamic revolution.”
Yadollah Javani, head of the political bureau of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Joint Command Council, affirmed that “we will reconsider our defense doctrine if the enemy carries out its threats.”
This raises the question of whether these statements are merely a bargaining chip in negotiations to avert any potential military action by the US and Israel, or if they clearly indicate that the Iranians now believe that acquiring a nuclear weapon has become a national necessity.
If Iran’s nuclear doctrine were to change and it pursued the acquisition of a nuclear bomb, as stated by Larijani, this would negatively impact its relations with its Arab neighbors, particularly the Gulf states. Iran has recently adopted a policy of openness toward these countries, which have engaged in diplomatic efforts, led by Saudi Arabia, to alleviate tensions. Therefore, proponents of the nuclear military option should not only focus on deterring Washington and Tel Aviv, as they often claim, but also consider the adverse consequences such a decision would have on its relations with the Gulf states, which require trust-building, cooperation and the enhancement of economic, tourism and security partnerships.
There are numerous diplomatic alternatives that could be more beneficial for Tehran than pursuing a nuclear bomb that could effectively safeguard it from potential attacks. Smart and long-term diplomacy remains the safest approach, even if it is a challenging and protracted process.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse and the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran. X: @Halmustafa